| Each Member State shall be legally required to prepare a national risk assessment that outlines appropriate steps to identify, assess, understand and mitigate the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting it. |
No. The AML Act creates a coordination forum for authorities’ risk assessments, but no explicit national provision found here clearly requiring Denmark itself to prepare a national AML/CFT risk assessment.
(Bekendtgřrelse af lov om forebyggende foranstaltninger mod hvidvask og finansiering af terrorisme (hvidvaskloven), § 74) |
| Member states shall be legally required to keep the national risk assessment up to date and review it at least every 4 years. |
No. No explicit national provision found here requiring the national risk assessment to be kept up to date and reviewed at least every four years.
|
| Member states should legally designate an authority or mechanism to co-ordinate actions to assess risks. |
Yes. The AML Act designates a coordination mechanism: the Minister for Industry, Business and Financial Affairs must establish a forum including the supervisors and the FIU to coordinate authorities’ risk assessments and general measures.
(Bekendtgřrelse af lov om forebyggende foranstaltninger mod hvidvask og finansiering af terrorisme (hvidvaskloven), § 74) |
| The following conduct, when committed intentionally, is punishable as a criminal offence: the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from criminal activity, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an activity to evade the legal consequences of that person’s action; |
Yes. Conversion or transfer of money that is directly or indirectly the proceeds of a criminal offence, in order to conceal or disguise its illegal origin, is a criminal offence.
(Bekendtgřrelse af straffeloven, § 290 a, stk. 1) |
| The following conduct, when committed intentionally, is punishable as a criminal offence: the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of, property, knowing that such property is derived from criminal activity; |
No. The Criminal Code criminalises concealment-related handling of criminal proceeds, but no explicit provision found here covering the full indicator wording on concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights or ownership of property.
(Bekendtgřrelse af straffeloven, §§ 290 og 290 a) |
| The following conduct, when committed intentionally, is punishable as a criminal offence: the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing at the time of receipt, that such property was derived from criminal activity. |
No. The Criminal Code covers receiving or obtaining a share in criminal proceeds and certain concealment-related acts, but it does not clearly and expressly criminalise acquisition, possession or use in the exact terms of the indicator.
(Bekendtgřrelse af straffeloven, § 290) |
| Aiding and abetting, inciting and attempting a money laundering offence is punishable as a criminal offence. |
Yes. Attempt is punishable for offences with a maximum penalty exceeding four months, and aiding or abetting is generally punishable. Those rules apply to money laundering offences.
(Bekendtgřrelse af straffeloven, §§ 21 og 23) |
| Money laundering offences are punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least four years. |
Yes. Aggravated money laundering is punishable by imprisonment of up to eight years.
(Bekendtgřrelse af straffeloven, § 290 a, stk. 2) |
| A prior or simultaneous conviction for the criminal activity from which the property was derived is not a prerequisite for a conviction for money laundering offences |
No. No explicit national provision found here stating that a prior or simultaneous conviction for the predicate criminal activity is not a prerequisite for a money laundering conviction.
(Bekendtgřrelse af straffeloven, § 290 a) |
| A conviction for money laundering offences is possible where it is established that the property was derived from a criminal activity, without it being necessary to establish all the factual elements or all circumstances relating to that criminal activity, including the identity of the perpetrator; |
No. No explicit national provision found here stating that it is sufficient to establish that property derives from criminal activity without establishing all factual elements or the perpetrator of the predicate offence.
(Bekendtgřrelse af straffeloven, § 290 a) |
| Legal persons can be held liable for the breaches of Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 or Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 committed on their behalf or for their benefit by any person, acting individually or as part of a body of that legal person and having a leading position within that legal person, based on any of the following: a power to represent the legal person; an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person; an authority to exercise control within the legal person. |
No. Corporate liability exists, and breaches of the transfer-of-funds regulation are sanctionable, but no explicit national provision found here that matches the indicator’s specific rule on liability of legal persons for breaches of Regulations (EU) 2024/1624 and 2023/1113 by leading persons.
(Bekendtgřrelse af straffeloven, §§ 25-27; bekendtgřrelse af lov om forebyggende foranstaltninger mod hvidvask og finansiering af terrorisme (hvidvaskloven), § 78) |
| Legal persons can be held liable where the lack of supervision or control has made possible the commission of any money laundering offences for the benefit of that legal person by a person under its authority. |
No. Corporate liability is recognised in general terms, but no explicit national provision found here establishing liability specifically where lack of supervision or control enabled money laundering for the legal person’s benefit.
(Bekendtgřrelse af straffeloven, §§ 25-27) |
| Legal persons held liable are punishable by criminal or non-criminal fines. |
Yes. A legal person may be punished with a fine where the law so provides, and the corporate liability rules apply to legal persons generally.
(Bekendtgřrelse af straffeloven, §§ 25-27) |
| Legal persons held liable are punishable by other sanctions, such as: exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid; temporary or permanent exclusion from access to public funding, including tender procedures, grants and concessions; temporary or permanent disqualification from the practice of commercial activities; placing under judicial supervision; a judicial winding-up order; temporary or permanent closure of establishments which have been used for committing the offence. |
No. The Criminal Code provides corporate fines, but no explicit general provision found here imposing the additional sanctions listed in the indicator on legal persons held liable.
(Bekendtgřrelse af straffeloven, §§ 25-27) |
| In the event of a breach of Regulations (EU) 2024/1624 and (EU) 2023/1113, where obligations apply to legal persons, pecuniary sanctions can be imposed and administrative measures can be applied not only to the legal person, but also to the senior management and to other natural persons who under national law are responsible for the breach. |
Yes. Denmark’s AML framework substantively satisfies this indicator. Breaches of the national AML law and of the transfer-of-funds rules are sanctionable, and the sanctioning framework applies not only to legal persons but also to responsible natural persons, including members of management where relevant. Under the methodology, sanctions for breach of the national AML law implementing EU AML rules count as compliant.
(Bekendtgřrelse af lov om forebyggende foranstaltninger mod hvidvask og finansiering af terrorisme (hvidvaskloven), §§ 47, 57 og 78; Bekendtgřrelse af straffeloven, §§ 25-27) |
| Pecuniary sanctions shall be imposed on obliged entities for serious, repeated or systematic breaches, whether committed intentionally or negligently, of the requirements laid down in the following provisions of Regulation (EU) 2024/1624: Chapter II (Internal policies, procedures and controls of obliged entities); Chapter III (Customer due diligence); Chapter V (Reporting obligations); Article 77 (Record retention). |
No. The AML Act penalises listed breaches committed intentionally or with gross negligence, but it does not clearly establish the exact indicator rule of pecuniary sanctions for serious, repeated or systematic breaches whether intentional or negligent of Regulation (EU) 2024/1624.
(Bekendtgřrelse af lov om forebyggende foranstaltninger mod hvidvask og finansiering af terrorisme (hvidvaskloven), § 78) |
| Supervisors are able to apply administrative measures to an obliged entity, where they identify: breaches of Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 or Regulation (EU) 2023/1113, either in combination with pecuniary sanctions for serious, repeated and systematic breaches, or on their own; weaknesses in the internal policies, procedures and controls of the obliged entity that are likely to result in breaches of the requirements; that the obliged entity has internal policies, procedures and controls that are not commensurate with the risks of money laundering, its predicate offences or terrorist financing to which the entity is exposed. |
Yes. Supervisors oversee compliance and may order entities to take necessary measures where the law or applicable AML obligations are breached; Finanstilsynet may also temporarily prohibit the taking-on of new business in serious cases.
(Bekendtgřrelse af lov om forebyggende foranstaltninger mod hvidvask og finansiering af terrorisme (hvidvaskloven), §§ 47, 51 b, 57 og 60) |
| Where obliged entities fail to comply with administrative measures applied by the supervisor within the applicable deadlines, supervisors are able to impose periodic penalty payments in order to compel compliance with those administrative measures. |
No. Denmark provides coercive daily or weekly fines only for non-compliance with certain specified duties or orders; no clear general rule was found allowing periodic penalty payments for failure to comply with any administrative measure imposed by the supervisor.
(Bekendtgřrelse af lov om forebyggende foranstaltninger mod hvidvask og finansiering af terrorisme (hvidvaskloven), § 80) |
| Supervisors are required to publish on their website, in an accessible format, decisions imposing pecuniary sanctions, applying administrative measures or imposing periodic penalty payments. |
No. Publication duties cover reactions and certain decisions, but no explicit national provision found here clearly requiring publication of all decisions imposing pecuniary sanctions, administrative measures and periodic penalty payments in the exact terms of the indicator.
(Bekendtgřrelse af lov om forebyggende foranstaltninger mod hvidvask og finansiering af terrorisme (hvidvaskloven), §§ 55 og 62) |
Beneficial ownership of legal persons and legal arrangements |
| Beneficial ownership information must be held in a central register in the Member State where the legal entity is created or where the trustee of an express trust or person holding an equivalent position in a similar legal arrangement is established or resides, or from where the legal arrangement is administered. |
Yes. Beneficial ownership must be registered in the Central Business Register for legal persons and, where required, for trusts and similar legal arrangements.
(Bekendtgřrelse af lov om Det Centrale Virksomhedsregister, § 11 a, stk. 1-2; bekendtgřrelse om registrering af og adgang til oplysninger om ejere i Erhvervsstyrelsen, §§ 34-36) |
| Member States shall ensure that the entities in charge of the central registers are empowered to request from legal entities, trustees of any express trust and persons holding an equivalent position in a similar legal arrangement, and their legal and beneficial owners, any information necessary to identify and verify their beneficial owners, including resolutions of the board of directors and minutes of their meetings, partnership agreements, trust deeds, power of attorney or other contractual agreements and documentation. |
No. Absent from legal framework
|
| Where no person is identified as the beneficial owner, the central register shall include:
(a) a statement that there is no beneficial owner or that the beneficial owners could not be determined, accompanied by a corresponding justification
(b) the details of all natural persons who hold the position of senior managing officials in the legal entity equivalent to the following information: all names and surnames, place and full date of birth, residential address, country of residence and nationality or nationalities of the beneficial owner, number of identity document, such as passport or national identity document, and, where it exists, unique personal identification number assigned to the person by his or her country of usual residence, and general description of the source of such number |
No. Danish law requires registration of management where no beneficial owner can be identified, but it does not clearly require all detailed data listed in the indicator for all senior managing officials.
(Bekendtgřrelse om registrering af og adgang til oplysninger om ejere i Erhvervsstyrelsen, § 6, stk. 4) |
| Entities in charge of the central registers are required to verify, within a reasonable time upon submission of the beneficial ownership information, and on a regular basis thereafter, that such information is adequate, accurate and up to date. |
No. Entities and trustees must update and review beneficial ownership information, but I did not identify a clear rule requiring the register itself to verify submissions within a reasonable time and regularly thereafter.
(Bekendtgřrelse om registrering af og adgang til oplysninger om ejere i Erhvervsstyrelsen, § 6, stk. 5, og § 34, stk. 4; bekendtgřrelse af lov om forebyggende foranstaltninger mod hvidvask og finansiering af terrorisme (hvidvaskloven), § 46 a, stk. 5) |
| Competent authorities, if appropriate and to the extent that such requirement does not interfere unnecessarily with their functions, are required to report to the entities in charge of the central registers any discrepancies they find between information available in the central registers and the information available to them. |
Yes. Denmark expressly requires competent authorities to report discrepancies between beneficial-ownership information available to them and the information registered in Erhvervsstyrelsen’s system, together with documentation, as soon as possible, unless doing so would interfere unnecessarily with their functions. That matches the indicator in substance.
(Bekendtgřrelse af lov om forebyggende foranstaltninger mod hvidvask og finansiering af terrorisme (hvidvaskloven), § 15 a, stk. 2-3; Bekendtgřrelse om indberetning af uoverensstemmelser i oplysninger om reelle ejere, §§ 1-3) |
| The information contained in the central registers must include any change to the beneficial ownership of legal entities and legal arrangements and to nominee arrangements, following their first recording in the central register. |
Yes. Registered beneficial ownership information must be updated promptly after any change.
(Bekendtgřrelse om registrering af og adgang til oplysninger om ejere i Erhvervsstyrelsen, § 6, stk. 5, og § 34, stk. 4) |
| The entity in charge of the central register is empowered, whether directly or by application to another authority, including judicial authorities, to carry out checks, including on-site inspections at the business premises or registered office of legal entities, in order to establish the current beneficial ownership of the entity and to verify that the information submitted to the central register is accurate, adequate and up-to-date. |
No. Absent from legal framework
|
| Where verification leads an entity in charge of a central register to conclude that there are inconsistencies or errors in the beneficial ownership information, the entity in charge of a central register is able to withhold or refuse to issue a valid certificate of proof of registration, or to suspend the validity of an existing certification of proof of registration. |
No. Absent from legal framework
|
| The entity in charge of the central register is empowered to, whether directly or by application to another authority, including judicial authorities, apply effective, proportionate and dissuasive measures or impose such pecuniary sanctions for failures, including of a repeated nature, to provide the central register with accurate, adequate and up-to-date information about their beneficial ownership. |
No. Danish law provides fines for failures and incorrect registrations, but I did not identify a clear rule empowering the central register itself to impose the full measures or sanctions described.
(Bekendtgřrelse af lov om Det Centrale Virksomhedsregister, § 22, stk. 2 og 5; bekendtgřrelse om registrering af og adgang til oplysninger om ejere i Erhvervsstyrelsen, § 58) |
| Competent authorities have immediate, unfiltered, direct and free access to the information held in the interconnected central registers without alerting the legal entity or legal arrangement concerned. These competent authorities include: self-regulatory bodies in the performance of supervisory functions of AML rules; tax authorities; national authorities with designated responsibilities for the implementation of Union restrictive measures; AMLA for the purposes of joint analyses; EPPO; OLAF; Europol and Eurojust when providing operational support to the competent authorities of Member States. |
No. Competent authorities have access, including FIUs, supervisors, tax and sanctions authorities, AMLA, EPPO, OLAF, Europol and Eurojust, but the law does not clearly state immediate, unfiltered, direct and free access in the terms used by the indicator.
(Bekendtgřrelse om registrering af og adgang til oplysninger om ejere i Erhvervsstyrelsen, §§ 45-46, 49 og 51) |
| Beneficial ownership information held in central registers may be made available to obliged entities upon payment of a fee, which shall be limited to what is strictly necessary to cover the costs of ensuring the quality of the information held in the central registers and of making the information available. Those fees shall be established in such a way as not to undermine effective access to the information held in the central registers. |
No. Obliged entities may access beneficial ownership information, but I did not identify a clear binding rule limiting any fee to strict cost recovery or guaranteeing that fees cannot undermine effective access.
(Bekendtgřrelse af lov om Det Centrale Virksomhedsregister, § 11 a, stk. 3, og § 20, stk. 2; bekendtgřrelse om registrering af og adgang til oplysninger om ejere i Erhvervsstyrelsen, §§ 45, 47 og 49) |
| Any natural or legal person that can demonstrate a legitimate interest in the prevention and combating of money laundering, its predicate offences and terrorist financing has access to the following information on beneficial owners of legal entities and legal arrangements held in the interconnected central registers, without alerting the legal entity or legal arrangement concerned:
the name of the beneficial owner; the month and year of birth of the beneficial owner; the country of residence and nationality or nationalities of the beneficial owner; for beneficial owners of legal entities, the nature and extent of the beneficial interest held; for beneficial owners of express trusts or similar legal arrangements, the nature of the beneficial interest. |
Yes. Persons with a legitimate interest have access to the listed beneficial ownership data for legal entities and legal arrangements.
(Bekendtgřrelse om registrering af og adgang til oplysninger om ejere i Erhvervsstyrelsen, §§ 45, 48 og 49) |
| The following natural or legal persons shall be deemed to have a legitimate interest to access the information listed above: persons acting for the purpose of journalism, reporting or any other form of expression in the media, that are connected with the prevention or combating of money laundering, its predicate offences or terrorist financing; |
Yes. Persons acting for journalism, reporting or other media expression connected to AML/CFT are deemed to have a legitimate interest.
(Bekendtgřrelse om registrering af og adgang til oplysninger om ejere i Erhvervsstyrelsen, § 48, stk. 1, nr. 1) |
| The following natural or legal persons shall be deemed to have a legitimate interest to access the information listed above: civil society organisations, including non-governmental organisations and academia, that are connected with the prevention or combating of money laundering, its predicate offences or terrorist financing; |
Yes. Civil society organisations, including NGOs and academia connected to AML/CFT, are deemed to have a legitimate interest.
(Bekendtgřrelse om registrering af og adgang til oplysninger om ejere i Erhvervsstyrelsen, § 48, stk. 1, nr. 2) |
| The following natural or legal persons shall be deemed to have a legitimate interest to access the information listed above: natural or legal persons likely to enter into a transaction with a legal entity or legal arrangement and who wish to prevent any link between such a transaction and money laundering, its predicate offences or terrorist financing; |
Yes. Persons likely to enter into a transaction with a legal entity or legal arrangement to avoid an AML/CFT link are deemed to have a legitimate interest.
(Bekendtgřrelse om registrering af og adgang til oplysninger om ejere i Erhvervsstyrelsen, § 48, stk. 1, nr. 3) |
| The following natural or legal persons shall be deemed to have a legitimate interest to access the information listed above: Member States’ public authorities in the context of public procurement procedures, in respect of the tenderers and operators being awarded the contract under the public procurement procedure; |
Yes. Member States’ contracting authorities in public procurement procedures are deemed to have a legitimate interest.
(Bekendtgřrelse om registrering af og adgang til oplysninger om ejere i Erhvervsstyrelsen, § 48, stk. 1, nr. 9) |
| Member States shall ensure that the information provided by central registers does not lead to the identification of any person consulting the register where such persons are: persons acting for the purpose of journalism, reporting or any other form of expression in the media, that are connected with the prevention or combating of money laundering, its predicate offences or terrorist financing; |
No. Beneficial owners may obtain a list of persons with legitimate interest who have access, so the law does not ensure non-identification of journalistic applicants.
(Bekendtgřrelse af lov om Det Centrale Virksomhedsregister, § 18 b) |
| Member States shall ensure that the information provided by central registers does not lead to the identification of any person consulting the register where such persons are: civil society organisations that are connected with the prevention or combating of money laundering, its predicate offences or terrorist financing. |
No. Beneficial owners may obtain a list of persons with legitimate interest who have access, so the law does not ensure non-identification of civil society applicants.
(Bekendtgřrelse af lov om Det Centrale Virksomhedsregister, § 18 b) |
| Where entities in charge of central registers decide to grant access to beneficial ownership information, they shall issue a certificate granting access for 3 years. Entities in charge of central registers shall respond to any subsequent request to access beneficial ownership information by the same person within 7 working days. |
Yes. Access is granted by a certificate valid for three years, and subsequent requests from the same person must be answered within seven working days.
(Bekendtgřrelse om registrering af og adgang til oplysninger om ejere i Erhvervsstyrelsen, § 53) |
| Member States shall ensure that entities in charge of central registers shall only refuse a request to access beneficial ownership information on one of the following grounds: the applicant has not provided the necessary information or documents pursuant to paragraph 1; a legitimate interest to access beneficial ownership information has not been demonstrated; where on the basis of information in its possession, the entity in charge of the central register has a reasonable concern that the information will not be used for the purposes for which it was requested or that the information will be used for purposes that are not connected to the prevention of money laundering, its predicate offences or terrorist financing; one or more of the situations referred to in Article 15 applies; the legitimate interest to access beneficial ownership information granted by the central register of another Member State does not extend to the purposes for which the information is sought; where the applicant is in a third country and responding to the request to access information would not comply with the provisions of Chapter V of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. |
Yes. The refusal grounds for access requests are listed exhaustively in the binding secondary legislation.
(Bekendtgřrelse om registrering af og adgang til oplysninger om ejere i Erhvervsstyrelsen, § 56) |
| In exceptional circumstances to be laid down in national law, where the access to beneficial ownership information would expose the beneficial owner to disproportionate risk of fraud, kidnapping, blackmail, extortion, harassment, violence or intimidation, or where the beneficial owner is a minor or otherwise legally incapable, Member States shall provide for an exemption from such access to all or part of the personal information on the beneficial owner. Member States shall ensure that such exemptions are granted on a case-by-case basis upon a detailed evaluation of the exceptional nature of the circumstances and confirmation that those disproportionate risks exist. The right to an administrative review of the decision granting an exemption and the right to an effective judicial remedy shall be guaranteed. |
Yes. The law allows case-by-case exemptions from access in exceptional circumstances involving disproportionate risks, minors or legally incapable persons.
(Bekendtgřrelse om registrering af og adgang til oplysninger om ejere i Erhvervsstyrelsen, § 50) |
| Each Member State shall ensure that all obliged entities established in its territory are subject to adequate and effective supervision. To that end, each Member State shall appoint one or more supervisors to monitor effectively, and to take the measures necessary to ensure compliance by the obliged entities with Regulations (EU) 2024/1624 and (EU) 2023/1113. |
Yes. Danish law assigns AML/CFT supervision of obliged entities to designated supervisors, including the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority, the Danish Business Authority, the Bar Council and the Gambling Authority.
(Consolidated Act on Preventive Measures against Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (Anti-Money Laundering Act), Sections 47, 57, 64 and 65) |
| Each Member State shall establish an FIU in order to prevent, detect and effectively combat money laundering and terrorist financing. |
Yes. Denmark has established a financial intelligence unit. The Danish FIU is the Money Laundering Secretariat within the National Special Crime Unit.
(Consolidated Act on Preventive Measures against Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (Anti-Money Laundering Act), Section 29(1); Circular on Denmark’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), Section 1) |
| The FIU as the central national unit shall be responsible for receiving and analysing suspicious transaction reports and other information relevant to money laundering, associated predicate offences or terrorist financing. |
Yes. The FIU is the central national unit responsible for receiving and analysing suspicious transaction reports and other relevant information relating to money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing.
(Consolidated Act on Preventive Measures against Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (Anti-Money Laundering Act), Section 29(2)(1)) |
| The FIU shall be responsible for disseminating the results of its analyses and any additional relevant information to the competent authorities where there are grounds to suspect money laundering, associated predicate offences or terrorist financing. |
Yes. The FIU must disseminate the results of its analysis and any additional relevant information to competent authorities, bodies and agencies where there is suspicion of money laundering, associated predicate offences or terrorist financing.
(Consolidated Act on Preventive Measures against Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (Anti-Money Laundering Act), Section 29(2)(2)) |
| The FIU shall be operationally independent and autonomous, which means that the FIU shall have the authority and capacity to carry out its functions freely, including the ability to take autonomous decisions to analyse, request and disseminate specific information. It shall be free from any undue political, government or industry influence or interference. |
Yes. The law expressly states that the FIU is operationally independent and autonomous, with authority and capacity to perform its tasks freely and to take autonomous decisions to analyse, request and disseminate information.
(Consolidated Act on Preventive Measures against Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (Anti-Money Laundering Act), Section 29(1)) |
| The FIU, regardless of their organisational status, is authorised to have access to the information that they require to fulfil their tasks, including financial, administrative and law enforcement information. |
Yes. Taken together, the Danish framework substantively authorises the FIU to access the information it needs to perform its tasks. Hvidvasksekretariatet may require any information necessary from obliged entities, can obtain records and relationship information on request, and is given access to central mechanisms for bank-account and real-property identification. Given its placement within the National Special Crime Unit, the framework also gives it functional access to law-enforcement information. The existing explanation relied too heavily on the absence of one single explicit formula.
(Bekendtgřrelse af lov om forebyggende foranstaltninger mod hvidvask og finansiering af terrorisme (hvidvaskloven), § 29, stk. 1, 2 og 4, § 30, stk. 3, og §§ 30 a-30 b; Cirkulćre om Hvidvasksekretariatet) |
| FIUs are empowered to take urgent action, directly or indirectly, where there is a suspicion that a transaction is related to money laundering or terrorist financing, to suspend or withhold consent to that transaction. |
Yes. For larger or especially suspicious transactions, obliged entities must refrain from carrying out the transaction until they have reported it and obtained the FIU’s approval, and the FIU must arrange a decision on seizure by the end of the following banking day.
(Consolidated Act on Preventive Measures against Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (Anti-Money Laundering Act), Section 26(4)) |
Mutual legal assistance (MLA) and International Cooperation |
| Member States shall ensure that the FIU to whom the request is made is legally required to use the whole range of its available powers which it would normally use domestically for receiving and analysing information when it replies to a request for information from another FIU. |
Yes. The FIU must cooperate as fully as possible with other EU Member State FIUs and must respond immediately to, and as far as possible comply with, requests related to onward dissemination of information.
(Consolidated Act on Preventive Measures against Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (Anti-Money Laundering Act), Section 29a(2)) |
| Member States shall ensure that FIUs are legally required to exchange, spontaneously or upon request, any information that may be relevant for the processing or analysis of information by the FIU related to money laundering, its predicate offences, or terrorist financing, and the natural or legal person involved, regardless of the type of predicate offences that may be involved, and even if the type of predicate offences that may be involved is not identified at the time of the exchange. |
Yes. The FIU must, spontaneously or on request, provide all information to other EU Member State FIUs for the performance of the FIU tasks, regardless of the type of associated predicate offence and even where that offence has not yet been identified at the time of exchange.
(Circular on Denmark’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), Sections 5-6) |
Denmark
41(72) Political Financing 
9(57) Financial Disclosure 
16(49) Conflict of Interest 
46(59) Freedom of Information 
53(63) Public Procurement 
55(66) Anti Money Laundering 
67(71) Asset Recovery